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Abstract
Empirical evidence on the effect of corporate income tax on economic growth is
mixed. This paper explores the ambiguous mechanism of corporate income tax by
using a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous innovators and endoge-
nousmarket structure. Ourmain findings are as follows: (i) Corporate tax cuts do not
necessarily enhance innovation. (ii) Corporate tax cuts are likely to have a positive
growth effect when the research and development (R&D) productivity across firms is
heterogeneous. (iii) R&D tax deduction increases the growth rate. (iv) Based on our
calibration, the corporate tax cut in 2018 had a negative effect on economic growth
and welfare in the U.S. economy.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, almost all OECD countries have decreased corporate tax rates (see
Table 1). In a recent example, the U.S. cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% in
2018. The main purpose of the corporate tax cuts is to expand rewards for business
activities such as investments. The policy seems to be a good plan from the viewpoint
of the Schumpeterian growth model, because it theoretically raises post-innovation profit
and enhances innovation-driven growth. The Schumpeterian view predicts a negative
relationship between corporate tax rate and economic growth rate.
Year U.S. Japan Germany U.K. France Italy Canada
2000 35.0 30.0 42.20 30.0 37.76 37.0 29.12
2005 35.0 30.0 26.38 30.0 34.93 33.0 22.12
2010 35.0 30.0 15.83 28.0 34.43 27.5 18.00
2015 35.0 23.9 15.83 20.0 38.00 27.5 15.00
2018 21.0 23.2 15.83 19.0 34.43 24.0 15.00
Year Korea Spain Australia Netherlands Turkey Sweden
2000 28.0 35.0 34.0 35.0 33.0 28.0
2005 25.0 35.0 30.0 31.5 30.0 28.0
2010 22.0 30.0 30.0 25.5 20.0 26.3
2015 22.0 28.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 22.0
2018 25.0 25.0 30.0 25.0 22.0 22.0
Table 1: The corporate tax rate in some OECD countries. Source: OECD.Stat (Statutory Corporate
Income Tax Rates)
However, empirical evidence on the effect of corporate taxes on macroeconomic
growth is mixed. On the one hand, Mertens and Ravn (2013) show that corporate tax
is harmful for growth. In particular, they estimate that a 1% decrease in the corporate
income tax rate raises real GDP per capita by 0.4% by stimulating private sector invest-
ment. Lee and Gordon (2005) and Shevlin et al. (2019) also find a negative relationship
between the corporate income tax rate and future economic growth. On the other hand,
Angelopolous et al. (2007) find that the corporate tax rate is weakly positively related
with growth. Widmalm (2001) also reports a similar positive relation between corporate
tax revenues (as share of total tax revenues) and growth. Furthermore, some studies find
that the growth effect of taxation is negligible. Mendoza et al. (1997) provide evidence
that supports the conjecture of Harberger (1964) that the growth rate is neutral in relation
to tax rates. Ojede and Yamarik (2012) also find that the state-level corporate income tax
has no short- or long-term impact on state-level growth.
To reconcile the mixed evidence, this paper theoretically shows the unclear relation-
ship between the corporate income tax and economic growth. We introduce corporate
income tax into a Schumpeterian growth model where innovators are heterogeneous and
the number of firms is endogenously determined. In this model, we show that the growth
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effect of a corporate income tax cut can be either positive or negative depending on the
current tax rate, the level of patent protection, and the degree of heterogeneity across
firms. In particular, when firms are heterogeneous in R&D productivity, there is an
inverted-U relationship between corporate tax rate and growth rate. We also incorporate
R&D tax deduction into the model and show that a higher tax deduction rate increases
growth rate and amplifies the growth effect of corporate income tax cuts both positively
and negatively. Furthermore, by calibrating the U.S. economy, we evaluate the growth
effect of the 2018 corporate tax cut. Our simulation result shows that the policy had a
negative effect on economic growth, with a growth-maximizing corporate tax rate around
50%.
The corporate income tax cut has an ambiguous growth effect in our model, with one
positive effect and two negative effects on economic growth. First, the corporate income
tax cut stimulates R&D investment by increasing the (after-tax) post-innovation profit
(the Schumpeter effect). The increase in post-innovation profit in our endogenous market
structure model, however, is partially weakened by a negative effect; the corporate tax cut
induces the entry of firms because the pre-innovation profit also rises. As the number
of firms increases, the market becomes more competitive. This inhibits the increase in
post-innovation profit (the competition-enhancing effect). Finally, corporate income tax cuts
discourage R&D investment by increasing R&D cost. This policy expands the number
of firms and raises the labor demand for production. Because this raises the wage rate
in the labor market equilibrium, it negatively affects innovation (the cost-increasing effect).
Consequently, corporate income tax cuts maywork to reallocate economic resources from
R&D activities to production.
The competition-enhancing effect seems to be consistent with some empirical studies.
For example, Papke (1991) finds that a high tax rate reduces the number of manufactur-
ing firm start-ups. Further, in the literature of international tax competition, tax-cutting
reforms significantly affect multinational firms’ choice of location. The wage-increasing
effect is also empirically supported; studies show a negative relationship between cor-
porate income tax and wages. For example, using data on 55,082 companies in nine
European countries, Arulampalam et al. (2012) estimate that a $1 raise in taxes reduces
wages by 49 cents.
Related literature
Aghion et al. (2016) also demonstrate an inverted-U relationship between corporate
income tax and growth. To generate non-monotonicity, they assume that tax revenue
is used to invest in public infrastructure that helps R&D activity. While corporate tax
cuts increase rewards from successful R&D, they also have a negative effect on growth
by impeding the accumulation of public infrastructure. This implies, conversely, that the
inverted-U relationship in Aghion et al. (2016) depends crucially on public infrastructure.
In contrast, we show that even without public infrastructure, the relationship between
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corporate income tax and growth can be an inverted-U.
Peretto (2007) shows that corporate income tax has two opposite effects on growth,
with corporate income tax enhancing growth when the R&D tax credit rate is 100%
because the negative effect disappears. Beyond that, however, the author does not analyze
anything about the growth effect; in contrast, we explicitly show that the relationship
between corporate income tax and growth can be an inverted-U shape when the R&D
productivity across firms is heterogeneous. Moreover, our numerical analyses evaluate
the U.S. tax reform in 2018 under plausible parameters. Therefore, although the results
of Peretto (2007) partially overlap with ours, there are notable differences between his
contributions and our own.
Iwaisako (2016) considers the effects of reducing the corporate tax rate accompanied
by an increase in the consumption tax rate. The author incorporates the several taxes
into a standard Schumpeterian growthmodel and shows that the growth-maximizing tax
policy is zero corporate income tax and a high consumption tax rate. Because the author
assumes that the governmentmust balance the budget constraint, a high consumption tax
rate enables the government to decrease corporate income tax that enhances innovation
through the Schumpeterian effect. In other words, corporate income tax is harmful for
economic growth in the model of Iwaisako (2016). In contrast, our model shows that the
growth effect of corporate income tax can be either positive or negative; the evidence is
mixed.
Roadmap
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 builds our model and
Section 3 solves the steady state. Section 4 investigates the effect of the corporate tax cut
on the growth rate. Section 5 conducts a simulation by calibrating the U.S. economy and
evaluates the growth effect of 2018 tax reform. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
To develop our model, we incorporated endogenous market structure and heterogeneity
into theGrossmanandHelpman (1991, Ch.4)model. Specifically, while the originalmodel
assumes Bertrand competition, we assume that all firms engage in Cournot competition.
Out setup allows us to consider policy effect on the number of firms; in the original model
market, the only firm is monopolist. We also assume that each firm’s R&D productivity
is heterogeneous; in our model, R&D firms and non-R&D firms coexist in the market. In
reality, of course, not all existing firms invest in R&D. Our model enables us to consider
the effect of policy on the ratio of innovative firms.
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2.1 Households
Our household setup is exactly the same as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4). Our
model economy consists of identical and infinitely living households. Time is continuous
and there is no population growth. The population size of each household is given by
L > 0. Each household supplies a unit of labor inelastically and earns a wage in every
period. A representative household has the following intertemporal utility function:
Ut =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt) lnCtdt, (1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and Ct is an index of consumption at time t. The
economy has a continuum of industries indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and the households consume
final goods across all industries. The period utility is given by
lnCt =
∫ 1
0
ln

 k˜(i)∑
k=0
λkXkt(i)

 di, (2)
where Xkt(i) is the consumption of a good whose quality is λ
k in industry i at time
t, and k˜(i) means that innovation has occurred k˜(i) + 1 times in industry i. In the
industry, there are k˜(i) + 1 generations of goods (k = 0, 1, ..., k˜(i)), and according to the
additive specification in the abovementioned period utility, they are perfect substitutes
for households. The quality of each good is represented as an integer k power of λ > 1,
which means that the quality of the new good is λ times higher than the previous one.
The budget constraint of each household is
A˙t = rt At + wt + Tt − Ct. (3)
At is the real value of assets (equities), rt is the real interest rate, and wt is the wage rate. Tt
is a lump-sum transfer from the government. We assume that the government distributes
all tax revenue to each household equally in every period.
The expenditure is given by
Et =
∫ 1
0
ln

 k˜(i)∑
k=0
pkt(i)Xkt(i)

 di, (4)
where pkt is the price of the good whose quality is λ
k. Hereafter, the notations often omit
i and t for simplicity when there is no room for confusion.
We solve the utility maximization problem in two steps: static problem and dynamic
problem. First, given instantaneous expenditure level Et, we maximize the period utility
function lnCt. Under the logarithmic utility function, households spend their budget
equally across the product line i ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for each line, they choose the latest
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good that has the lowest quality-adjusted price. Therefore, the individual demand in
industry i is Xk˜(i) = E/pk˜(i) for k = k˜ and Xk(i) = 0 for k = 0, 1, ..., k˜− 1.
Second, we solve the dynamic maximization problem. Each household decides the
expenditure Et in each period so as to maximize intertemporal utility function, Ut, subject
to the intertemporal budget constraint. Their indirect period utility function is given by
lnCt = ln Et − ln Pt, where Pt is the ideal price index associated with the consumption
index Ct, which is defined as
ln Pt =
∫ 1
0
ln
(
pk˜t(i)
λk˜(i)
)
di. (5)
Given the aggregate price index, households spend to maximize their intertemporal
utility. From the maximization result, the household’s optimal time path for spending
is represented by E˙t/Et = rt − ρ. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and
subsequent studies, we treat the expenditure as the nume´raire by normalizing the price
index in each period so that Et = 1. This means that the price index falls over time at the
growth rate of the consumption index. Then, we obtain rt = ρ.
2.2 Industries
Consider an industry in which there is a leader and some followers who imitate the
leader’s good. Let F denote the total number of followers in the industry.
In the model, there are two types of followers: “innovative followers” and “non-
innovative followers.” The non-innovative follower only produces the imitated good.
The innovative follower not only produces the imitated good but also conducts R&D
investment for further innovation. Let fR ∈ [0, 1] denote the ratio of innovative followers
to all followers.
We consider a two-stage game variant of Mankiw and Whinston (1986). In the first
stage, each potential firm decides whether to enter the industry as a follower. In the
second stage, the leader and F followers engage in Cournot competition. They earn the
Cournot profit in each period until a certain innovative follower succeeds in her R&D. The
successful innovative follower can then replace the current industry leader. Other firms
will instantaneously try to re-enter the industry by imitating the new leader’s good, and
a new two-stage game starts again. Fig.1 briefly illustrates the structure of this model.
Note that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and other subsequent studies,
because of Arrow’s replacement effect, the leader in each industry does not perform R&D.
Even if the current leader succeeds in performing R&D, their firm ?s value does not
increase because the latest good is instantaneously imitated by the followers. Empirically,
even though it has the ability to innovate, the leader?s firm tends to lack the incentive to
do so. 1
1For example, Igami (2017) shows that successful incumbents in the hard disk drive industry are reluctant
to innovate even though they have a substantial cost advantage.
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Leader Followers
New Leader
Successful
Innovation!
Innovation
Quality in a product line
Imitation
Figure 1: Model structure. The quality-ladder on the left-hand side shows each follower entering
an industry by imitating the leader’s good. After one follower succeeds in performing R&D, that
follower becomes the new leader and obtains a patent on the latest good whose quality is λ times
higher than that of the previous one, as shown on the right-hand side. Then, in a new two-stage
game, the old leader and old followers re-enter the industry by imitating the new leader’s good.
Note that this figure does not imply that the model has two different states, as the imitation occurs
instantaneously.
In the following subsections,we solve the two-stageproblemwithbackward induction.
2.3 Cournot competition
Consider an industry that consists of a leader and F followers. We assume that they all
engage in Cournot competition where their unit production costs are asymmetric. While
the leader can produce one state-of-the-art good by using one unit of labor, followersmust
devote χ > 1 units of labor to produce one unit of the same quality good, where χ ∈ (1,λ)
is the parameter of cost-disadvantage for followers. For example, if χ = 1, followers can
imitate the production technology of the new innovator perfectly. Thus, χ captures the
degree of difficulty of imitation for followers (e.g., the level of patent breadth).
As we derived in Section 2.1, the inverse demand function for goods in an industry
is p = 1/X. Given the inverse demand function and the wage rate of one unit of labor,
w, producer j maximizes their after-tax profit, pij. Accordingly, the profit maximization
problem is
max
yj
pij = (1− τ) 1
X
· yj − γPj w · yj, (6)
where τ is the corporate income tax rate, yj is the output level, and γ
P
j is the unit cost of
production. Note that γPj = 1 when producer j is the leader and γ
P
j = χ when they are a
follower. By solving (6), we obtain the output of producer j as follows:
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∂pij
∂yj
= 0 ⇔ (1− τ) 1
X
− (1− τ) 1
X2
yj − γPj · w = 0
⇔ yj = X −
γPj w · X2
1− τ . (7)
In market equilibrium, the aggregate demand X equals the aggregate output in the
industry. We assume that all followers are symmetric. Then, themarket clearing condition
is
X = yL + F · yF ≡ Y, (8)
where yL is the leader’s output, yF is the output of each follower, and Y is the aggregate
industry output. Using (7) and (8), we can derive the industry’s aggregate output in the
Cournot equilibrium as follows:
Y = Y− wY
2
1− τ + F ·
(
Y− χwY
2
1− τ
)
⇔ Y =
(
F
1+ χF
)(
1− τ
w
)
. (9)
Then, the Cournot equilibrium price is
p =
(
1+ Fχ
F
)(
w
1− τ
)
. (10)
Using (7) and (9), we obtain the equilibrium output of each producer as follows:
yF =
F
(1+ χF)2
(
1− τ
w
)
, (11)
yL =
F[1+ (χ− 1)F]
(1+ χF)2
(
1− τ
w
)
. (12)
Then, the followers’ and leader’s after-tax profits are
piF(F) = (1− τ)
(
1
1+ χF
)2
, (13)
piL(F) = (1− τ)
(
1− F
1+ χF
)2
. (14)
The after-tax profits decrease in τ and F. Therefore, as potential followers enter, the profits
of existing firms shrink.
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2.4 Entry
We assume that all followers must incur a fixed operating cost cF in each period for late
arrival.2 In reality, leader firms have a certain first-mover advantage and by abusing their
monopolistic position may be able to prevent potential firms from entering the industry.
In addition, each leader can secure influential trademarks, less expensive land, visibility
through advertisements, and a specific relationship with retailers earlier than the late
entrants. These activities will work to generate some fixed operating costs for follower
firms.3 We assume that the fixed operating cost is paid by devoting labor. More formally,
we assume that cF = wLF, where LF is the amount of labor devoted to incur the fixed cost.
After each follower earns the after-tax Cournot profit piF, they must pay the fixed
operational cost cF. They cannot survive if piF is strictly smaller than cF. This implies,
conversely, that a potential firm can enter the market as long as the Cournot profit is
greater than the fixed cost. Then, the free-entry condition for production is given by
piF ≤ cF, (15)
where the equality holds when F > 0.
2.5 R&D
All followers who paid cF choose whether to perform R&D activities that may succeed
in creating a high-quality good. We assume that R&D activities are performed only by
existing firms that produce goods for the market, an assumption justified by considering
that the research productivity of existing firms is higher than that of potential firms,
because manufacturing experience gives the producer essential clues about further in-
novations. This assumption is in contrast to Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and
other subsequent studies, because they assume that only potential firms engage in R&D
activities. In their model, no existing firm has an incentive to innovate because every
existing firm is already a monopolist. (This is Arrow?s replacement effect.) However, in
reality, we often observe R&D investment by existing firms. Recent empirical studies have
found that existing firms’ own-product improvement, rather than creative destruction by
market entrants, is amajor source of economic growth, (e.g., Bartelsman andDoms (2000);
Garcia-Macia et al. (2019)). In particular, Garcia-Macia et al. (2019) report that 80.2% of
TFP growth for 2003-2013 in the U.S. is attributed to innovation by existing firms. We
believe that, in the quality-improvement innovation model, existing firms’ R&D activities
rather than potential firms’ R&D activities should be highlighted.
The success of R&D investment follows a Poisson process. A follower j can draw a
2Suzuki (2019a) regards this cost as the patent licensing fee paid by followers and examines the optimal
licensing strategy of patent holders.
3In reality, leaders are often prohibited by antitrust laws from performing such activities. Therefore, the
fixed cost can also be considered a governmental policy variable. Suzuki (2019b) investigates the effect of the
fixed cost on average innovation to explore the competition-innovation relationship.
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lottery that may succeed in performing R&D, with a small probability of aj ∈ [amin, amax],
by employing one worker. We assume that followers are heterogeneous in their R&D
efficiency (amin < amax). When each follower enters the market, it realizes that its own aj.
For simplicity, we assume that aj is uniformly distributed in [amin, amax].
We assume that there is a R&D tax deduction in this economy. If firm j is an innovative
follower, it can deduct a part of the R&D cost (the wage paid to a researcher) from the
corporate income. Let the taxable corporate income be pyj − ζw where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is the
R&D tax deduction rate. We assume that that τζw is refunded to innovative followers
when they perform R&D.
The R&D tax credit is a popular tax incentive system in developed countries. For
example, in the Federal U.S. tax system, the R&D tax credit is equal to 20% of the excess
of qualified research expenses over a calculated base amount. For simplicity, we assume
that the base amount is zero.
A follower conducts R&D investment if the net benefit of R&D is positive, or else they
become a non-innovative follower. Then, the condition for performing R&D is given as
ajVt ≥ (1− τζ)wt, (16)
where Vt is the value of innovation.
2.6 Equilibrium
To make the analysis meaningful, we consider a parameter range where the number of
followers is strictly positive. Then, as free-entry condition (15) holds with equality, F is
determined as follows:
F∗ =
1
χ
(√
1− τ
cF
− 1
)
. (17)
This equation suggests that the corporate tax rate has an upper bound τ˜ = 1− cF.
We focus on a realistic situation in which research firms and imitators coexist (0 <
fR < 1). In reality, not all existing firms invest in R&D. In particular, many small and
medium-sized enterprises do not engage in any research (see Chambers et al. (2002) and
Ho et al. (2005)).
There is a marginal follower who is indifferent to performing R&D. As her net benefit
from performing R&D is zero, we have
a¯V = (1− τζ)w, (18)
where a¯ is the cutoff value of R&D efficiency. This implies that a fortunate follower who
draws aj ∈ [a¯, amax] becomes an innovative follower. Then, the fraction of innovative
follower is given by
fR =
amax − a¯
amax − amin . (19)
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In the economy, the labor is allocated to production, paying operating fixed cost, and
R&D investments. At labor market equilibrium, the aggregate labor demand must be
equal to labor supply L. The condition of labor market equilibrium (LME) is
yL + F · χyF + F
( cF
w
)
+ F fR = L. (20)
Consider the returns from holding a particular leader’s stock. The leader earns piL
in every period, and it is perfectly distributed to the stockholders. However, the leader’s
stock loses its value when a certain innovative follower is successful in innovating. We
assume that there is a perfectly risk-free asset market and the interest rate on the safe
assets is equal to rt. Therefore, the following equation holds as a no-arbitrage condition
(NAC) in the asset market.
rVt = piL(F) + V˙t −Ω(F, fR)Vt, (21)
where Ω(F, fR) is the aggregate innovation rate, given by (for the calculation, see also
panel (a) in Fig.4),
Ω(F, fR) =
∫ F
(1− fR)F
(
amin +
amax − amin
F
x
)
dx
=
1
2
[2amax − (amax − amin) fR]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average probability
· F fR︸︷︷︸
Number of innovators
, (22)
which is increasing in F and fR ∈ (0, 1). The first part in (22) is the average R&D success
probability of innovative followers. If all followers are innovative ( fR = 1), the average
probability is (amax + amin)/2. Also, the average probability is (amax when fR = 0. This is
a case in which only a follower who has amax is innovative (note that the measure is zero).
In the homogeneous case (amax = amin = a), the average probability is always a.
3 The steady state
In the following, we derive two important equations that characterize the steady state in
the economy. First, using (14),(17), (24) and V˙ = 0, and rearranging, we obtain
V =
(√
cF/χ + (1− 1/χ)
√
1− τ)2
ρ + Ω(F, fR)
. (23)
This is decreasing in fR and is illustrated as the downward sloping curve “NAC” in Fig.2.
Second, by substituting (11), (12), and (17)-(19) into (20) and rearranging, we obtain
V =
(1− τζ)LˆY
[amax − (amax − amin) fR](L− F fR) , (24)
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Figure 2: Phase diagram in the case of 0 < f ∗R < 1.
where LˆY is a constant defined as
LˆY ≡ cF
χ
(√
1− τ
cF
− 1
)[(
2− 1
χ
)√
1− τ
cF
+
1
χ
]
. (25)
Equation (24) is represented by the upward sloping curve “LME” in Fig.2. The intersection
of the two curves is the steady state of the economy. The steady state is unique and
unstable. As there are only jumpable variables in the dynamics, there are no transitional
dynamics in the model, and the economy immediately jumps to the steady state at t = 0.
This feature guarantees that the comparative statics between different steady states are
applicable in the evaluation of policy effects.
We evaluate welfare by assuming that the economy starts in the steady state from
t = 0. Using (2) and (8), we can decompose the period utility as follows:
lnCt = gt · t + lnYt, (26)
where gt is the economic growth rate. The steady-state value of g and Y are calculated as
follows:
g = Ω lnλ, (27)
and,
Y =
1
χ
(
1−
√
cF
1− τ
)(
1− τ
w
)
. (28)
In other words, the growth rate is determined by the rate of new innovation arrivals and
the size of innovation. The steady-state wage rate in Y is determined by (18), (19), and V∗.
By integrating the lifetime utility function with respect to time, we obtain the repre-
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sentative household’s welfare as follows:
W =
1
ρ

 lnλρ Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Innovation
+ lnY︸︷︷︸
Consumption

 . (29)
This tells us that the welfare can be decomposed into two parts: the speed of quality-
upgrading innovation and the quantity of consumption.
4 The relationship between corporate tax and growth
4.1 The corporate tax cut and two curves in Fig.2
We examine the effect of corporate tax cut (τ ↓) on the growth rate. Since lnλ in (27) is
constant, we only have to check the effect on Ω. From (22), it can be decomposed to the
effect through F and the effect through fR. The former effect is obviously positive from
(17), because the corporate tax cut increases the number of innovative followers if fR is
constant. The latter effect is unclear, because fR is determined by the intersection of two
curves in Fig.2. In the following, we investigate the direction of shifts of NAC curve and
LME curve.
The corporate tax cut has an ambiguous effect on NAC curve because there are two
opposite effects. The first is a negative effect. Because the corporate tax cut increases
the number of followers F∗, given as fR, it increases Ω in the denominator of (23). This
implies that the leader’s expected survival time becomes shorter, and it negatively affects
the incentive to innovate. The second is a positive effect. From (14), this policy naturally
increases the leader’s after-tax profit, and it stimulates the followers’ incentive to innovate
(the Schumpeterian effect). This effect is captured by the increase in the numerator of (23).
But the Schumpeterian effect is mitigated by the increase in the number of followers, be-
cause a stronger market competition shrinks the Cournot profit (the competition-enhancing
effect). This result implies that the corporate tax cut does not dramatically increase the
after-tax profit.
In contrast, the effect on the LME curve is clear. From (24), the corporate tax cut
necessarily shifts up the LME curve and thus generates a movement along the NAC curve
that produces slower growth. This is the cost-increasing effect through the labor market.
A rise in the number of followers increases the labor demand for production. Then, the
equilibrium wage (=R&D cost) rises, which discourages followers’ incentive to innovate.
As a result, the total effect on the growth rate is ambiguous because the direction
of shift of the NAC curve is unclear. However, we can show the following statement
analytically.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the corporate tax rate is at the upper bound (τ = τ˜). Then, (i) fR = 1,
(ii) g = 0, and (iii) dg/dτ < 0 hold.
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Figure 3: The effects of the corporate tax change in a heterogeneous economy and a homogeneous
economy. Parameters are L = 10,λ = 1.2,χ = 1.2, ρ = 0.03, (amax, amin) = (0.05, 0.05) and
(0.1, 0), cF = 0.05, and ζ = 0.2. The solid lines show the heterogeneous case and the dotted lines
show the homogeneous case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Property (iii) in proposition 1 states that the corporate tax cut from the upper bound τ˜
necessarily increases the growth rate. This also implies that the relationship between the
corporate tax rate and the growth rate at least cannot be globally positive. Therefore, the
relationship between them is either globally negative or non-monotone (e.g., inverted-U
shape).
4.2 The relationship with heterogeneity
We investigate how the degree of heterogeneity in R&D efficiency affects the policy
effect. To highlight the role of heterogeneity, we consider a homogeneous case in which
amax = amin = a holds as a benchmark economy.
Proposition 2. In the homogeneous case (amax = amin = a), the corporate tax cut decreases the
growth rate when fR < 1 and increases the growth rate when fR = 1.
Proof. In the case of fR = 1, this result is obvious from (17) and (22). See Appendix for
the case of fR < 1.
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Proposition 2 states that, in the homogeneous case, the relationship between the
corporate income tax rate and the growth rate is globally non-monotone (see also Panel
(a) in Fig.3). However, because a corner solution situation fR = 1 is unrealistic and we
focus on the case of fR < 1, we should note that the corporate income tax cut always
decreases the growth rate in the homogeneous case. The clear relationship is inconsistent
with the empirical findings. Hence, the homogeneous case fails to show an unclear
relationship between τ and g.
However, a numerical example of the (mean-preserving) heterogeneous case in Panel
(a) in Fig.3 shows that, within a realistic range fR ∈ [0, 1), there is an inverted-U relation-
ship between corporate tax and growth. In this case, the corporate tax cut has a positive
effect on the growth rate to the right of the peak. Therefore, it should be emphasized
that heterogeneity produces an ambiguous relationship between corporate tax rate and
growth that is consistent with empirical findings.
Corporate tax cuts can have a positive effect on the growth rate in heterogeneous cases.
As mentioned above, corporate tax cuts increase the number of followers who draw the
lottery of R&D productivity, and this has a positive effect on growth. However, as shown
in Panel (d) in Fig.3, corporate tax cuts decrease the ratio of innovative followers fR, and
this has a negative effect on growth.4 Therefore, as shown in Fig.4, the total effect is
ambiguous. But Panel (d) in Fig.3 also shows that the negative effect on fR is relatively
mild in the heterogeneous case. There is a following selection mechanism. The corporate
tax cut induces only inefficient followers (low aj) to give up their R&D activities while
efficient followers (high aj) can keep conducting them. Conversely, in the homogeneous
case, the corporate tax cut inducesmany identical followers to stop their R&D investment.
Furthermore, the selection mechanism mitigates the effect of the decrease in fR on Ω by
increasing the average R&D success probability in (22). However, (22) also tells us that this
selection mechanism disappears when amax = amin. This is also a reason why corporate
tax cuts cannot have a positive growth effect in homogeneous cases.
Intuitively, in the homogeneous case, the corporate tax cut just reallocates labor from
the R&D sector to the production sector. However, in the heterogeneous case, the corpo-
rate tax cut also reallocates labor from inefficient followers to efficient followers.
4.3 The relationship with patent protection
We investigate how the strength of patent protection affects the tax policy effect.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the patent protection is the weakest (χ = 1). Then, the corporate
tax cut necessarily decreases the ratio of innovative followers ( fR).
Proof. Assume that χ = 1 holds. Then, the Schumpeter effect disappears (see the numer-
ator in (23)). Therefore, the tax cut shifts the NAC curve downward and the LME curve
upward.
4This means that the Schumpeterian effect is dominated by the cost-increasing effect in both cases.
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Figure 4: The effects of corporate tax cut on the threshold, the number of innovative followers,
and the ratio of innovative followers in a heterogeneous economy. The policy raises the threshold
of R&D productivity. In other words, the policy discourages inefficient followers from conducting
R&D (negative effect). However, the policy also raises the number of followers who draw the lottery
of R&D productivity. Therefore, it increases the number of relatively efficient followers (positive
effect).
This proposition suggests that the corporation tax cut is likely to have a negative effect
on economic growth under a weak patent protection. A numerical analysis in panel (a)
of Fig.5 shows that the conjecture is partially correct. The range of downward sloping
becomes broader when patent protection is weak. Therefore, corporation tax cuts are
likely to reduce growth rate.
Fig.5 also shows that when the patent protection is stronger, the growth-maximizing
corporate tax rate is smaller. Weak patent protection decreases the leader’s profit, because
many followers enter the market through imitation. Furthermore, R&D cost increases,
because many followers demand labor to produce the imitated goods. Therefore, to
enhance innovation, the government should exclude followers by setting the corporate tax
at a higher rate. Conversely, when patent protection is strong, the follower has sufficient
incentive to innovate through the Schumpeterian effect. In this case, the government
does not need to exclude the followers by increasing the corporate tax. Consequently,
growth-maximizing corporate tax rate is smaller as patent protection is stronger.
Panel (c) of Fig.5 shows that there is a parameter range where the welfare-maximizing
corporate tax rate is smaller as the patent protection is stronger. Our result is in contrast to
the finding of Iwaisako (2016) that, from the perspective of welfare, the corporate income
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Figure 5: Patent protection and the effects of the corporate tax change. Parameters are L =
10,λ = 1.2,χ = 1 and 1.2, ρ = 0.03, amax = 0.2, amin = 0, cF = 0.05, and ζ = 0.2.
tax rate should be higher as patent protection becomes stronger. The difference in results
comes from our endogenous market structure. In both models, under a strong patent
protection, labor may be excessively devoted to R&D from the perspective of welfare. In
our model, to reallocate labor from R&D to production, the corporate tax rate should be
smaller, because it encourages the entry of followers who produce imitated goods. In
other words, corporate tax cut crowds out R&D investment in our model. However, in
the Bertrand competition model of Iwaisako (2016) in which there is no actual entry of
potential firms to reallocate labor from R&D to production, the corporate tax rate should
be larger because it discourages potential firms’ incentive to innovate.
4.4 R&D tax deduction
Proposition 4. Suppose that 0 < τ < τ˜. Then, a higher R&D tax deduction rate ζ increases the
ratio of innovative followers and the economic growth rate.
Proof. Suppose that ζ is increased while other parameters are unchanged. Then, the LME
curve shifts downward unless τ = 0, and it increases fR. Because ζ does not affect F, this
tax deduction (ζ ↑) increases the aggregate innovation rate Ω.
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Figure 6: R&D tax deduction and the effects of the corporate tax change. Parameters are L =
10,λ = 1.2,χ = 1.2, ρ = 0.03, amax = 0.2, amin = 0, cF = 0.05, and ζ = 0 and 0.6.
As there is a broad agreement that tax incentives stimulate R&D, proposition 4 is
consistent with many empirical studies (e.g., Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996); Hall and van
Reenen (2000); Bloom et al. (2002); Minniti and Venturini (2017)).
Fig.6 is our numerical example. The statement in proposition 4 is represented as in
Panels (a) and (d) of Fig.6. By proposition 1, g and fR are independent from ζ when
τ = 0 and τ = τ˜. This simply captures the fact that the R&D tax deduction becomes
meaningless as the corporate tax rate approaches zero. As ζ rises, the curve in Panel (a)
expands upward while each end point is unchanged. This implies that the corporate tax
cut is likely to have a negative growth effect when the R&D tax deduction rate is high and
the corporate tax rate is already low. Therefore, we obtain a policy implication that the
growth-maximizing corporate tax rate depends on the level of tax incentive.
5 Quantitative analyses
This section provides a numerical example under plausible parameter values to evaluate
the growth effect of the U.S. tax reform in 2018.
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5.1 Calibration of the U.S. economy
Let us calibrate the structural parameters (L, λ, χ, ρ, amax, amin, cF). We calibrate the
parameters by targeting the scenario in which innovation drives an average economic
growth rate of 2% in the U.S. under the corporate tax rate until 2017, τ = 0.35, and the
regular R&D credit ζ = 0.2.
According to Hashmi (2013), the average of 1−Lerner in the U.S. is 0.76. In our model,
1−Lerner is F/(1+ F). This means that F ≃ 3.17. We set the average markup of price
over marginal cost to 1.33. This is in the plausible range (see Basu (1996) and Jones and
Williams (2000)). In our model, the average markup, ψ, in an industry is
ψ =
1/3.17+ χ + 3.17+ 1/χ
4.17
. (30)
By solving this, we obtain χ ≃ 1.06. We assume that the patent protection in the U.S. is
almost perfect and adopt λ = χ = 1.06. This corresponds to Park (2008) and shows that
the patent right index in the U.S. is 4.88 (the maximum is 5), the biggest in the world. This
value is also very close to the 1.05 adopted in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2002). Using (17)
and F ≃ 3.17, we set cF = 0.0349. Chambers et al. (2002) shows that the average number
of non-R&D firms is 2,679 while the average number of R&D firms is 1,792. Therefore,
the rest of parameters must be determined to satisfy fR ≃ 0.4. We set the discount rate ρ
to a conventional value of 0.03 and assume that amin = 0. Then, by using amax and L as
free parameters, we numerically find that amax = 0.335 and L = 23 satisfy fR ≃ 0.4 and
g ≃ 0.02.
5.2 Results
Fig.7 shows our numerical results. Panel (b) and (d) display the effect of the corporate tax
on the number of followers and the ratio of innovative followers, respectively. From (22),
combining these two effects yields the relationship between the corporate tax rate and the
growth rate in panel (a).
Panel (a) shows that there is an inverted-U relationship between the corporate tax and
economic growth. The growth-maximizing tax rate is around 50%, and the corporate tax
cut has a negative impact on growth to the left of the peak. Therefore, our numerical
result implies that the corporate tax cut in the U.S. in 2018 (35%→ 21%) has a negative
growth effect. Quantitatively, the policy decreases the growth rate around 0.11%. Our
result suggests that the corporate tax rate should be a higher, not lower. This result seems
to be consistent to the result in Aghion et al. (2016) that finds that the growth-maximizing
corporate tax rate (≃ 42.47%) is higher than the actual rate. Panel (d) shows that the
welfare will be improved by raising the corporate tax rate. Therefore, our result suggests
that the corporate tax rate should be higher from the perspective of welfare, not only
growth.
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Figure 7: Simulation results of the U.S. economy.
6 Conclusion
Is corporate income taxation harmful to economic growth? The conventional answer is
yes, but empirical evidence is mixed and unclear. To explore the ambiguous mechanism
of corporate income taxation, this paper develops a Schumpeterian growth model with
heterogeneous innovators and endogenous market structure.
First, we found that the corporate tax cut does not necessarily enhance innovation,
because the market becomes more competitive and R&D cost rises. In particular, our
analyses show that the relationship between the corporate tax rate and economic growth
rate can be inverted-U. Second, the corporate tax cut is likely to have a positive effect when
the R&D productivity across firms is heterogeneous, while the growth effect is always
negative in the homogeneous case. In reality, we observe a few R&D-intensive firms but
many non-R&D firms. Therefore, the result in the heterogeneous case is more plausible.
Third, R&D tax deduction increases growth rate. Finally, we calibrated the U.S. economy
and show that the corporate tax cut in 2018 had a negative effect on economic growth and
welfare.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Proof. (i) Recall that F∗ = 0 holds when τ = τ˜ ≡ 1− cF. Then, from (24) and (25), when
τ → τ˜, the LME curve shifts downward and approaches a horizontal line V = 0. In
contrast, the RHS in (23) is always positive in τ ∈ [0, τ˜] Therefore, at some τ = τˆ < τ˜, the
NAC curve intersects the LME curve on fR = 1. This means that fR reaches the upper
bound in τ ∈ [τˆ, τ˜]. (ii) It is obvious by substituting F∗ = 0 into (22). (iii) The growth rate
is g = Ω lnλ. Therefore, we only have to check the effect on Ω. By differentiating Ω with
respect to τ,
∂Ω
∂τ
= G′( fR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
d fR
dτ
F∗ + G( fR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
dF∗
dτ︸︷︷︸
−
, (31)
where G( fR) ≡ (1/2)[2amax − (amax − amin) fR] fR. Recall that F∗ = 0 holds when τ = τ˜.
Then, ∂Ω/∂τ < 0.
Proof of proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that amax = amin = a and fR < 1. Then, (23) and (24) becomes
V =
(√
cF/χ + (1− 1/χ)
√
1− τ)2
ρ + aR
, (32)
and,
V =
(1− τζ)LˆY
a(L− R) , (33)
where R ≡ F fR is the number of innovative followers. By solving these equations and
using (22), we obtain
Ω =
Γ(τ)aL− ρ
Γ(τ) + 1
. (34)
where
Γ(τ) =
(√
cF/χ + (1− 1/χ)
√
1− τ)2
(1− τζ)LˆY
=
1
1− τζ
[
(χ− 1)2(1− τ) + 2(χ− 1)c1/2F (1− τ)1/2 + cF
(2χ− 1)(1− τ)− 2(χ− 1)c1/2F (1− τ)1/2 − cF
]
. (35)
Because Ω increases in Γ, the proof is completed if we show that Γ is increasing in τ. Since
1/(1− τζ) increases in τ, if we show that the bracket in (35) is also increasing in τ, the
proof is completed.
For simplicity, we define t ≡ 1− τ ∈ (cF, 1]. Using this, we express the numerator
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and the denominator in the bracket in (35) as follows:
f (t) = (χ− 1)2t + 2(χ− 1)c
1
2
F t
1
2 + cF, (36)
and,
g(t) = (2χ− 1)t− 2(χ− 1)c
1
2
F t
1
2 − cF. (37)
By definition, we only have to show that the sign of f ′(t)g(t)− f (t)g′(t) is negative in
t ∈ (cF, 1]. Computing and rearranging, we obtain
f ′(t)g(t)− f (t)g′(t) = − [(χ− 1)2 − (2χ− 1)] cF
− [(χ− 1)3 + (χ− 1)(2χ− 1)] c1/2F t1/2. (38)
This is decreasing in t. Therefore, if f ′(cF)g(cF)− f (cF)g′(cF) < 0, this is always negative
in t ∈ (cF, 1]. We can observe that the condition holds as follows:
f ′(cF)g(cF)− f (cF)g′(cF) = −χ3cF < 0. (39)
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